efficiency in common pool resource management by Brucks Wernher M et al.
This article was downloaded by:[Brucks, Wernher M.]
[Brucks, Wernher M.]
On: 24 May 2007
Access Details: [subscription number 778856809]
Publisher: Psychology Press
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954
Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Social Influence
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t716100705
Group norms, physical distance, and ecological
efficiency in common pool resource management
To cite this Article: Brucks, Wernher M., Reips, Ulf-Dietrich and Ryf, Bettina , 'Group
norms, physical distance, and ecological efficiency in common pool resource
management', Social Influence, 2:2, 112 - 135
To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/15534510701193436
URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15534510701193436
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf
This article maybe used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction,
re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly
forbidden.
The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be
complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should be
independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,
demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or
arising out of the use of this material.
© Taylor and Francis 2007D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
B
r
u
c
k
s
,
 
W
e
r
n
h
e
r
 
M
.
]
 
A
t
:
 
1
7
:
0
3
 
2
4
 
M
a
y
 
2
0
0
7
 
# 2007 Psychology Press, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business
http://www.psypress.com/socinf DOI: 10.1080/15534510701193436
Group norms, physical distance, and ecological
efficiency in common pool resource management
Wernher M. Brucks, Ulf-Dietrich Reips, and Bettina Ryf
University of Zurich, Switzerland
Earlier research has repeatedly shown that people tend to follow group norms
when using common pool resources. The present commons dilemma study
seeks to extend these findings with two inherently relevant concepts: First, the
ecological efficiency of the group norm, and second, the physical distance
between the actors involved. Physical distance was manipulated by adminis-
tering a web-based commons dilemma task to participants in the laboratory
versus participants in the Internet. Ecological efficiency was manipulated by
giving participants feedback about an overusing or a conserving group norm
while the pool was either big or small. Conformity effects were strongest when
the perceived group norm was ecologically efficient and participants were
physically closer. Moreover, the effect of physical distance was mediated by
the importance a person attached to the group’s behavior. When physically
farther apart, individuals attached less importance to the group’s behavior
and, as a consequence, showed less conformity. The results are discussed in the
light of previous commons dilemma research and social psychological theories,
and consequences for natural resource management are reflected.
Some common pool resources and the environmental problems associated
with them are rooted on a local level (e.g., residential waste disposal or fresh
water use), but others have a rather global dimension (e.g., air pollution or
the greenhouse effect). Although local problems may often affect us more
than global ones, both types of environmental problems are an integral part
of our everyday life and local action is often relevant for global resources as
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well. In the present contribution, we argue that these two forms of
environmental problems (global vs local) may be connected with several
social psychological processes related to people’s adherence to group norms
(e.g., Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000).
The idea that a person’s tendency to conform to a group norm of
consumption behavior may vary as a function of the physical distance
between the actors involved is well captured in Latane ´’s Theory of Social
Impact (e.g., Latane ´, 1981), recently also known as Theory of Dynamic
Social Impact (e.g., Latane ´, 1996). The closer people are to each other when
managing a common pool, the more they may be willing to adhere to a given
group norm. In most cases one can think of, individuals sharing a local
resource (e.g., fresh water) are physically closer to each other than
individuals sharing a global resource (e.g., a clean atmosphere). Thus, the
Theory of Social Impact suggests that the sharing of local resources should
depend more on perceived group norms than the sharing of local resources.
At the same time, other motives than conformity may also play a role for
an individual’s consumption behavior. People may only be willing to
gravitate towards the consumption pattern of their close neighbors when it
is ecologically efficient because they have a strong motive to preserve the
common pool resource from being depleted (see Wilke, 1991). If others’
consumption is relatively high but resources are scarce, people may be less
inclined to conform than in a situation where resources are abundant and
over-consumption would be less harmful.
Thus, with the present research we propose novel boundary conditions to
the well-established finding that people generally tend to follow others’
consumption behavior in situations of common pool resource management
(e.g., Schroeder, Jensen, Reed, Sullivan & Schwab, 1983). The knowledge of
these boundary conditions may be relevant for at least two reasons. First,
progress in the social sciences is made not only by finding main effects of
certain factors but also by exploring their scope of validity. In the case of
group norms in common pool resource management, this has not been done
in the past. Second, the knowledge of boundary conditions for the
effectiveness of group norms may lead to new and better approaches in
directing people’s behavior towards the sustainable use of common pool
resources.
Our hypotheses are based on Latane ´’s Theory of Social Impact (1981) and
on Wilke’s GEF Hypothesis (1991). To test them, we employed a commons
dilemma experiment (see Kopelman, Weber, & Messick, 2002) with pre-
programmed feedback about an efficient vs inefficient group norm. We
conducted the experiment in the laboratory (i.e., small physical distance
between actors) and in the Internet (i.e., big physical distance between
actors), and measured the amount of resources (i.e., points) the participants
took out of a virtual common pool.
GROUP NORMS IN A COMMONS DILEMMA 113D
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  GROUP NORMS IN COMMON POOL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT
In the present context, group norms are defined as ‘‘what most people do’’
in a given situation. This kind of group norm has been called descriptive
norm (see Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991; Kallgren et al., 2000), in
contrast to prescriptive group norms. Descriptive group norms are known to
influence individual behavior in many situations of mutual interdependence,
besides other general interaction norms such as the norm of reciprocity, for
example (see Kerr, 1995, for an overview). As one instance for a situation of
mutual interdependence, a group of people may be sharing a common pool
of energy. For example, a settlement may be connected to an embankment
dam or a solar power system that delivers a limited amount of energy, which
represents the common pool. Previous research has repeatedly shown that
people are generally inclined to conform to descriptive norms under such
circumstances (e.g., Schroeder et al., 1983).
Schroeder et al. (1983), for example, found that the actions of others
had a major influence on the behavior of individuals in a commons
dilemma where participants share a common pool of points. Their
participants immediately conformed to the feedback they received about
others’ consumption behavior. As an explanation, Schroeder et al. argued
that others’ consumption behavior helps define the situation. It reduces the
uncertainty of how to act in the ambivalent situation of a commons
dilemma where immediate individual welfare (i.e., using the common pool)
and long-term collective welfare (i.e., preserving the common pool) are at
odds.
Other laboratory studies have already analyzed boundary conditions for
conformity in common pool resource management. For example, people
showed a stronger tendency to follow the behavior of the group when they
believed the group to be the main cause for the actual size of the common
pool resource (e.g., Messick, 1986; Rutte, Wilke, & Messick, 1987;
Samuelson, Messick, Wilke, & Rutte, 1986). When the size of the common
pool resource (i.e., the points left in the common pool) seemed to have
natural causes such as a diminished regeneration rate, people showed less
conformity and acted ecologically more efficiently. This phenomenon has
also been reported in a field study of water conservation in California
(Talarowski, 1982). People who used more water than they were allocated
tended to believe that the shortage was caused by others who were also
overusing, whereas people who stayed within their allocation felt that the
shortage was truly natural.
Conformity effects in common pool resource management also depend on
individual characteristics such as trust (e.g., Messick et al., 1983) or a
person’s social values (e.g., Kramer, McClintock, & Messick, 1986). When
114 BRUCKS, REIPS, RYFD
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the common pool resource is overused by the group, people who have high
trust in others and people with prosocial motivations do not follow the
collective overuse but rather adapt their behavior in response to the
declining pool by reducing their consumption. Low-trusters and selfish
people, on the other hand, are more inclined to follow others’ overuse and
reduce their consumption in a resource shortage to a much lesser extent than
prosocials or high-trusters.
In sum, there is a reasonable amount of evidence that group norms are an
important guideline for individual consumption behavior in common pool
resource management, and some boundary conditions for these conformity
effects have been identified so far. Considering the distinction between local
and global common pool resources points to another relevant boundary
condition for conformity effects, the physical distance between the actors
involved.
PHYSICAL DISTANCE AND CONFORMITY TO
GROUP NORMS
In common pool resource management, the physical distance between the
actors involved may vary to a large degree. In a group sharing a global
common pool such as the earth’s atmosphere, the physical distances
between the actors are usually rather large. On the other hand, in a situation
such as glass recycling or fresh water use in a local neighborhood, the
physical distances between the actors are shorter and others’ presence is
much more immediate. Importantly, the physical distance between the
actors may moderate the effects of group norms according to Latane ´’s
Theory of Social Impact (1981), recently also known as Theory of Dynamic
Social Impact (Latane ´, 1996).
Social Impact Theory (SIT) states that immediacy (I), as well as the
strength (S) and number (N) of other people, make up social influence (i) in
a multiplicative manner (i 5 SIN). Most important for the present purpose,
the more immediate others are (i.e., closeness in space or time, visual as well
as vocal contact, etc.) the stronger the social impact they have on an
individual. Therefore, one may suspect that individuals using a local
common pool are more inclined to conform with others’ consumption
patterns than individuals involved in the management of a global common
pool. For example, it may make a difference if a rather compact settlement
with well-defined boundaries is connected to a solar power system or if
several houses that are scattered over a wider area are connected to it. In the
former case the individuals are physically closer to each other than in the
latter case, and therefore people may be more inclined to follow the
consumption patterns of most others. This example also shows that physical
distance and the ‘‘globality’’ of resources are theoretically separate
GROUP NORMS IN A COMMONS DILEMMA 115D
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constructs although they often co-vary. A local resource can sometimes be
managed by a small group of well-defined others, located at a distance.
Compared to the amount of supporting research about the effects of
number of sources or targets (e.g., Jackson & Latane ´, 1981; Latane ´&
Harkins, 1976), the immediacy concept has received only limited attention
so far. To our knowledge, immediacy in the context of cooperation in
groups or the management of common pool resources has not been studied
at all. Moreover, most studies on physical distance yielded mixed results and
only partial support for Social Impact Theory.
In his meta-analysis, Mullen (1985, 1986) found that immediacy tended to
exert an influence on self-report measurements of subjective anticipated
tension, but not so much on other measurements that are closer to overt
behavior. Although Jackson (1986) criticized Mullen’s methodological
approach and defended the existence of immediacy effects on overt
behavior, not much support for Jackson’s claims can be found in the
literature until today. Early studies found only small effects on donations
(Jackson & Latane ´, 1981) or maze learning (Knowles, 1983, study 3), and a
recent study on minority influence found no main effect of immediacy at all
(Hart, Stasson, & Karau, 1999). The closest approach to overt behavior was
taken by studies in naturalistic settings like a zoo (Sedikides & Jackson,
1990) or a retail store (Argo, Dahl, & Manchanda, 2005). Whereas it was
found that zoo visitors tended to follow the experimenter’s instructions not
to lean on the rails in front of a birds’ cage the more immediate that person
was, no main effect of immediacy was found on customers’ selection of a
battery brand in a retail store.
One reason for these weak and inconsistent effects may be found in the
way that immediacy has been operationalized in the past. In many
instances, it involved some indication of interpersonal distance, measured
in physical units such as feet or meters. For example, operationalizations
included the distance door-to-door solicitors stood from the door (Jackson
& Latane ´, 1981), the distance with which a camera shot was taken of a
source of social influence (Wolf & Latane ´, 1981), or the distance a
confederate was situated from the target of social influence in a retail store
setting (Argo et al., 2005). First of all, we suspect that most of these
manipulations were not strong enough to warrant the desired perceptions
of physical distance in the targets of influence. Distance differences of a
few feet—or meters—may not be relevant enough to elicit effects on
conformity. What is considered a relevant distance likely depends on the
context: In an office or in a retail store, a small difference between
distances of a few feet may already matter. Nevertheless, one may
speculate that bigger differences in distance will result in stronger
differences between effects of social influence. For example, in a series
of surveys, Latane ´, Liu, Nowak, and Bonevento (1995) found that the
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o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
B
r
u
c
k
s
,
 
W
e
r
n
h
e
r
 
M
.
]
 
A
t
:
 
1
7
:
0
3
 
2
4
 
M
a
y
 
2
0
0
7
 
number of memorable interactions decreased as a function of geographical
distance—ranging from 0.001 to 10,000 kilometers—raised to the first
power (see also Knowles, 1999, for an interpretation of these results).
However, a sufficiently strong manipulation of immediacy, including
distance differences of thousands of miles, is missing in research using a
controlled laboratory setting.
Many researchers—including Latane ´ himself (1981)—have also argued
that immediacy is a multidimensional construct consisting of physical and
psychological components (e.g., Monge, Rothman, Eisenberg, Miller, &
Kirste, 1985; Valacich, George, Nunamaker, & Vogel, 1994). And indeed,
many operationalizations of immediacy incorporate a psychological
dimension, in that the targets of social influence not only perceive the
physical distance as such but also an additional psychological distance
between the source of influence and themselves. For example, a closer
physical distance may also elicit stronger feelings of entitativity or group
identity because in most cases, small physical distances are also associated
with smaller groups and greater intimacy. Importantly, a strong group
identity may lead to more conformity within the group, and therefore it may
confound the effects of physical distance. Interestingly, the confounding
effect can also work the other way around. For example, physical closeness
may also even out prior differences in status because people high in status
tend to keep a certain distance from people of lower status. This can lead to
a situation where conformity is higher when the source of influence is distant
because a higher status is ascribed to that person (e.g., Hart et al., 1999; Lott
& Sommer, 1967).
The problem of confounding variables is particularly present in field
studies on immediacy, but also laboratory research has not completely
succeeded in isolating the effects of physical distance. In sum, past efforts
to manipulate immediacy were probably not effective enough to show the
effects that physical distance can have on conformity. The rather novel
possibility of using the Internet as a tool for conducting experiments is
opening new perspectives, because it is common knowledge that the
distance between Internet users can naturally vary between a few meters in
an office building and thousands of kilometers on different continents.
When we are interacting with others via the Internet we are mostly
ignorant of the distances between us and others, unless we receive specific
information about it. At the same time, the computer-mediated way of
interacting via the Internet makes it possible to hold constant most other
variables, such as a person’s appearance or voice, and other distractions
that naturally occur in group studies. Therefore, Internet-based group
research offers a good opportunity to control variables that are otherwise
confounding the effects of pure physical distance on conformity.
GROUP NORMS IN A COMMONS DILEMMA 117D
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  ECOLOGICAL EFFICIENCY OF GROUP NORMS
AND CONFORMITY
Let us assume that group norms are effective because the actors involved are
physically close to each other. In this case, we would propose that it may still
happen that people are not conforming because the perceived group norm is
ecologically inefficient. The efficiency of a group norm is defined as the
proportionality of the group norm with regard to the actual size of the
common pool resource. This definition is best understood by means of an
example. If residents of a small settlement get the impression that most
others are using too much energy from the common solar power plant, they
may be inclined to follow that overuse. If, at the same time, they get the
impression that the energy supply is very low, which does not allow a more
intensive consumption, they are in a conflict between saving and using
energy. This may weaken their original motive to conform because wasting
energy in that situation would not be efficient. With the GEF hypothesis,
Wilke (1991) described this conflict of motives in common pool resource
management.
The GEF hypothesis postulates three motives that guide human behavior
in situations of common pool resource management: Greed, Efficiency, and
Fairness. The greed motive describes an individual’s tendency to make as
much profit from the management of a common pool as possible. The
efficiency motive represents an individual’s desire to manage the pool in a
sustainable way in order to keep it going as long as possible. The fairness
motive defines an individual’s striving for fairness with regard to the
allocations that are made by the members of a group. Striving for fairness
can imply conformity, because it may lead an individual to adjust his or her
own consumption to the others’ consumption.
People may tend to follow others’ high use when resources are abundant
and others’ low use when resources are scarce in order to maintain
fairness, because both of these outcomes also agree with the individual’s
motive to use the pool efficiently. By overusing an abundant resource no
harm is done, and by conserving a scarce resource possible damage is
prevented. In contrast, an ecologically inefficient group norm may be less
followed because the efficiency motive comes into play and conflicts with
the fairness motive. Following others’ low use in times of abundance may
be constrained by the efficiency consideration that enough resources are
available. In the same way, following others’ high use in times of scarcity
may be constrained by the efficiency consideration that the pool has to be
preserved. To sum up our reasoning, the effects of distance on conformity
may be moderated by considerations of ecological efficiency in that
distance only matters when the consumption behavior of others accords
with the availability of resources.
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  THE PRESENT RESEARCH
To put our assumptions to the test we used the experimental paradigm of
the ‘‘Solar Energy Group Game’’ (SEGG; see Brucks, 2004). The SEGG is a
repeated commons dilemma task with completely pre-programmed feed-
back about the pool and about others’ behavior. A group of six persons is
supposed to share the energy of a solar power supply. The SEGG can be
accessed via the Internet,
1 which made it easy to manipulate the physical
distance between the participants. Individuals either participated via the
Internet where their physical distance is naturally bigger, or they came to the
laboratory where they were supposedly sitting close to each other but in
separate rooms. In both cases, a computer wrote participants’ decisions to a
log file that was later processed with the Scientific Log Analyzer (Reips &
Stieger, 2004).
2
The group norm is manipulated in the SEGG by providing participants
with false feedback about the consumption behavior of the whole group of
six persons (see Crutchfield, 1955), and no feedback about individual
behavior is given. Over the course of the task the common pool is pre-
programmed to decrease for all participants, while the simulated group
norm is changing from high consumption to low consumption for one half
of the participants (i.e., ecologically efficient condition) and from low to
high consumption for the other half of the participants (i.e., ecologically
inefficient condition). When the pool is decreasing it would be an efficient
behavior to consume a lot in the beginning and conserve at the end of the
task, but it would be inefficient to begin the task with conserving and then
consume a lot at the end. The present manipulation of group norms
provides us with the opportunity to observe compliance to efficient group
norms (i.e., overusing an abundant pool but conserving a scarce pool) as
well as compliance to inefficient group norms (i.e., overusing a scarce pool
or conserving an abundant pool).
With the present study, we expect to replicate the general finding that
participants follow the feedback about the group’s consumption behavior.
Specifically, we expect a within-subject interaction effect between the pool
1 The Solar Energy Group Game (SEGG) and the Web Experimental Psychology Lab are
accessible at: http://tinyurl.com/dwcpx)
2 To date, the Internet is an established medium for data collection in the social sciences.
Research has demonstrated that, in general, data collected through the Internet are of at least
equal quality to laboratory data, if the proper instruments for this type of data collection are
used (Reips, 2002a) and established standards are adhered to (Reips, 2002b). The SEGG was
designed with all known and possible preconditions to ensure the quality of the data collected
via the Internet. For example, by checking the Internet Protocol (IP) addresses, operating
system, and web browser of the computers that participants used, it was possible to identify
potential multiple submissions.
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size and the feedback people receive about the group norm. Receiving
feedback about an efficient group norm should result in more consumption
than receiving feedback about an inefficient group norm when the pool is
big, but in less consumption when it is small. More important, we seek to
extend this replication by hypothesizing that physical distance further
qualifies the effects of conformity in the sense of a three-way interaction. In
particular, individuals in the laboratory should conform more to the group
norm than individuals participating via the Internet. Finally, the moderating
effects of physical distance are expected to be stronger when the group norm
is ecologically efficient, which is the case for a norm of over-consumption at
the beginning of the task and for a norm of conservation at the end of the
task.
To offer a motivational account for the effects of physical distance, we
assume that the motive to conform becomes stronger when people are acting
close to each other. As a measure for the hidden conformity motive, we
adopt the assumption of Interdependence Theory that individuals engage in
information-seeking behavior that is directly relevant to their motivational
goals (see Kelley & Thibaut, 1978; Rusbult & Van Lange, 1996, p.578).
Consequentially, we asked participants how important the behavior of the
others was for their own decisions and expected that it was more important
for people who acted closer to each other. The scores on this item serve as a
mediator in a separate mediation analysis.
METHOD
Participants and experimental design
A total of 83 persons participated in the study (45 female, 28 male, average
age 24 years). The 43 participants in the big distance condition (21 female,
22 male, average age 26 years) were recruited via one of several web
laboratories such as the Web Experimental Psychology Lab (see Reips,
2001). The 40 participants in the low distance condition (24 female, 16 male,
average age 22) were University of Zurich undergraduates recruited in a
lecture.
The experimental design was a 2 (perceived group norm: ecologically
efficient vs inefficient) 6 2 (physical distance: large vs small) 6 2 (pool size:
large vs small) mixed model ANOVA with the first and second variable
being between-subjects and the third variable being within-subject.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the perceived group norm
conditions. The primary dependent variable was participants’ consumption
from the common pool. To explain the effects of physical distance with a
mediation analysis, we also measured the level of importance that
participants attached to the group norm as a secondary dependent variable.
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  Procedure
Participants were welcomed to the website (see Footnote 1) with text and
pictures that introduced them to the collective use of solar energy and
invited them to participate in a scientific experiment. They were informed
that the experiment would take 30 to 40minutes and that they could
possibly win cash prizes. After clicking on an OK button to signal their
willingness to participate, they were randomly assigned to one of the two
group norm conditions (efficient vs inefficient). Subsequently, participants
entered their demographic information and e-mail address. Once partici-
pants had agreed to participate in the experiment, they had to log into a
group of players. This led them to believe from the start that they were
interacting, through computers, with real people. An indicator on-screen
(see top of Figure1) showed that two people had already logged in; it
jumped to three when the participant joined. This procedure created the
impression that it would not be long before a total of six participants had
logged into the group. To maintain the impression that the participant was
interacting with other people throughout the entire commons dilemma task,
Figure 1. The user interface of the Solar Energy Group Game (SEGG). On the left is the
feedback about pool size (i.e., the batteries), on the right the feedback about group usage, near
the top the depiction of the group members and the feedback about the regeneration rate (i.e.,
the weather), and in the center the behavioral options, the related score, and the possible cash
prize if winner in a lottery.
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all six people were represented on-screen by figures labeled with their log-in
names (see top of Figure1). Then, after receiving detailed instructions on the
screen, participants accomplished the commons dilemma task and filled out
more questionnaires containing items for the secondary dependent variable,
manipulation checks, and other questions unrelated to the present study. All
participants were debriefed by e-mail after completion of the data collection.
Commons dilemma task
In the SEGG paradigm the common pool is represented by a shared solar
power supply. The task’s user interface, as it appeared to participants in
each round of the task, is shown in Figure1. Participants had to make 18
consecutive decisions from 11 options of energy use in 50 watt-hours (Wh)
increments from 0Wh to 500Wh. The use of energy was equated with
increasing quality of life. Each Wh consumed gave the participant one point
for quality of life. Participants were told that they would possibly receive
one Euro (approximately US$ 1.25) for 500 points, depending on the
outcome of a lottery. At the same time, the social dilemma structure of the
task was emphasized. The more a participant consumed the more he or she
could possibly win, but the longer the group was able to maintain the power
supply, the longer they could consume energy and the more everyone could
possibly win. After completion of the study, five participants were randomly
drawn—independent of their outcomes in the task—and each received a
prize of 20 Euro (approximately US$ 25) via standard mail.
Manipulation of independent variables
Manipulation of pool size. Although pool size per se is not an independent
variable in the present study, it was necessary to manipulate it in order to
operationalize the group norm and its ecological efficiency. Therefore, a red
indicator at the left-hand side of the user interface (see Figure1) displayed
the pool size from 0 to 5000Wh. The pre-programmed development of the
pool size created the impression that the pool had been maintained on a
high and stable level in the first six trials of the experiment (pool sizes in
stage one: 4250; 4000; 4200; 3950; 4100; 4250), decreased in the second six
trials (pool sizes in stage two: 3900; 3500; 3100; 2800; 2500; 2250), and
finally fell to nearly zero in the last six rounds (pool sizes in stage three:
1850, 1650, 1500, 1200, 900, 750).
3 This way, stages one and three
3 Another way of manipulating pool size within-subjects would have been to begin with a
small pool size and then to make a transition to a large pool. However, we chose the present
manipulation as we consider it to come closer to a real-world scenario. Actors are often
confronted with decreasing natural resources but seldom with an increasing one. We believe this
pool development to be more relevant for conservation behavior.
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represented a large pool and a small pool, respectively. Stage two was
mainly implemented to make a smooth transition of the pool size from being
large to being small. The internal dynamics of the pool were represented by
information about the current weather (see Figure1). The pool (i.e., the
amount of solar energy) regenerated more if it was sunny than if it was
cloudy or even rainy.
Manipulation of group norm and its ecological efficiency. A blue indicator at
the right-hand side of the user interface (see Figure1) displayed the pre-
programmed total consumption of solar energy by the group from 0Wh to
the maximum collective usage of 3000Wh (66500Wh). By definition, the
ecological efficiency of a group norm is a function of the pool’s size and
others’ behavior. Therefore, the pre-programmed feedback about the
group’s consumption changed during the course of the commons dilemma
task as a function of the group norm condition. For participants in the
‘‘inefficient group norm’’ condition a low group consumption in stage one
(average individual consumption: 185Wh) was followed by a high group
consumption in stage three (average individual consumption: 358Wh). For
participants in the ‘‘efficient group norm’’ condition a high group
consumption in stage one (average individual consumption: 322Wh) was
followed by a low group consumption in stage three (average individual
consumption: 171Wh). In stage two the consumption behavior of the group
was similar in both conditions (270Wh vs 260Wh), so no particular group
norm should be evoked. The behavior in the transition stage was highly
similar in all four between-subjects conditions (see Figure2 on p. 128).
Including the transition stage in the data analysis does not alter the relevant
results of this study and all reported effects remain significant.
Manipulation of physical distance. The perceived physical distance between
the participant and the others was manipulated in a straightforward way by
varying the mode of participation in the experiment. Participants either
came to the laboratory (small distance condition) or they participated at
home—or at any other place—via the Internet (large distance condition). In
the ‘‘small distance’’ condition, participants were met by the experimenter at
appointed times in the hall of a university building. They were brought to a
room with a computer workstation and received the information that they
were connected via the Internet to five other participants sitting in separate
rooms of the same building. It was emphasized that they were acting
anonymously, and that they would not meet the other members of the group
after the task. The experimenter left the room for a few minutes, supposedly
to go to the other members of the group, while the participant was reading
the welcome page, and then returned to give the permission to begin the
task. The experimenter then left the room again. When the task was
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completed the participant was thanked and released. The commons dilemma
task itself was completely identical to the one for participants in the ‘‘large
distance’’ condition. Participants in the ‘‘large distance’’ condition
completed the experiment on their own at home or any other place
equipped with a computer and a connection to the Internet. Therefore, they
perceived the distance between them and the other participants as naturally
a lot larger than participants in the ‘‘small distance’’ condition. Inspections
of the log files discovered no systematic drop-out in this condition. Once a
participant had begun the experiment, it was always completed in about the
same time as in the laboratory, on average.
Measurement of dependent variables. As for the primary dependent variable,
we analyzed participants’ six consecutive consumption decisions in stage one
(i.e., large pool) and their six consecutive decisions in stage three (i.e., small
pool). In both cases, we pooled these six decisions to an average
consumption behavior. As for the secondary dependent variable, we asked
participants after the first stage (i.e., large pool) and after the third stage
(i.e., small pool): ‘‘How important was the information of the group’s
average usage for your decisions?’’ (scale: highly important 5 1; not
important at all 5 5).
Measurements for manipulation checks. We checked the manipulation of
group norms by asking participants after stage one and after stage three,
‘‘What do you think about the behavior of the other players?’’ (scale: they
use little energy 5 1; they use much energy 5 5). Furthermore, we checked
the manipulation of pool size by asking participants after stages one and
three ‘‘What happened to the state of charge of the batteries during rounds
1 through 6? [13 through 18, respectively]’’ (scale: it dropped 5 1; it went up
5 5).
RESULTS
Manipulation checks
A repeated measures ANOVA on the item measuring the perceived group
norm revealed a significant within-subject interaction effect between stages
and group norm F(1, 79) 5 29.71, p , .001, g
2 5 .27. In both stages, the
simple main effects of the group norm were significant, Fs(1, 81) 5 12.9 vs
11.0, p , .001. In stage one, participants in the ‘‘efficient group norm’’
condition (M 5 2.92, SD 5 0.89) perceived others’ consumption to be
higher than participants in the ‘‘inefficient group norm’’ condition (M 5
2.30, SD 5 0.66). In stage three, it was vice versa (M 5 3.81, SD 5 0.88 vs
M 5 4.54, SD 5 0.62). Thus, the pre-programmed feedback about others’
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consumption was perceived as intended by our manipulation. Physical
distance and pool size had no effect on the perception of group norms,
Fs , 1.
A repeated measures ANOVA on the item measuring the perceived size of
the pool revealed a within-subject effect for pool size, F(1, 79) 5 884.8, p ,
.001, g
2 5 .92. Participants perceived a steady large pool in stage one (M 5
3.04, SD 5 0.40) and a sharply declined pool in stage three (M 5 1.14, SD 5
0.35). This shows that the participants perceived the difference between the
large pool condition and the small pool condition as intended by the
manipulation. Physical distance and the group norm had no significant
effects on the perception of the pool, Fs , 1.
Consumption behavior
We analyzed participants’ consumption decisions in absolute numbers with
a 2 (group norm: ecologically efficient vs inefficient) 6 2 (physical distance:
large vs small) 6 2 (pool size: large vs small) analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with repeated measures on the last factor. The means resulting from this
analysis are shown in Table1 where all subsequently reported effects are
labeled with subscripts.
As expected, the analysis revealed no between-subjects effects. Of
particular importance, people participating at home and people participat-
ing in the laboratory did not differ in their overall consumption, and there
was no interaction between physical distance and pool size either. This
shows that the two modes of participating in the experiment did not evoke
different reactions to the decreasing pool. However, a within-subject effect
of pool size was found, F(1, 79) 5 181.7, p , .001, g
2 5 .70, indicating that
participants consumed more when the pool was large than when it was small
(see Table1, comparison a). The average consumption dropped from 370.7
(SD 5 98.9) to 196.5 (SD 5 124.8), showing that the participants generally
adapted their consumption behavior to the deteriorating pool.
More important, the within-subject effect of pool size was qualified by an
interaction with the group norm, F(1, 79) 5 47.6, p , .001, g
2 5 .38, and the
simple main effects of group norm were significant in both stages, with a
large pool, F(1, 79) 5 7.9, p , .01, g
2 5 .09 (for means, see Table1,
comparison b), and with a small pool, F(1, 79) 5 25.1, p , .01, g
2 5 .24 (for
means, see Table1, comparison c). Taking a closer look at the means in
Table1, with a large pool participants getting feedback about the group’s
low use consumed less than those getting feedback about the group’s high
use (Ms 5 343.1 vs 405.0). Furthermore, they not only followed the
feedback about a high and efficient group norm of 322Wh but went
significantly beyond it by taking 405.0Wh, t(36) 5 5.46, p , .01.
Participants also followed the feedback about a low and inefficient group
GROUP NORMS IN A COMMONS DILEMMA 125D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
B
r
u
c
k
s
,
 
W
e
r
n
h
e
r
 
M
.
]
 
A
t
:
 
1
7
:
0
3
 
2
4
 
M
a
y
 
2
0
0
7
 
norm of 185Wh to some degree, but their average consumption of 343.1Wh
did not even come close to it. With a small pool, on the other hand,
participants receiving feedback about the group’s low consumption
consumed less than those receiving feedback about the group’s high
consumption (Ms 5 126.6 vs 252.7). Again, participants not only followed
the feedback about a low and efficient group norm of 171Wh but
significantly went below it by consuming 126.6Wh on average, t(36) 5
22.77, p , .01. And once again, participants also followed the feedback
about an inefficient group norm of 358Wh to some degree, but did not even
come close to it by consuming 252.7Wh on average. As expected, this
pattern of results shows that participants generally tended to adapt their
consumption to the feedback about the group’s consumption, whether it
was high or low. Additionally, and in line with our hypothesis, conformity
effects were stronger when the group norm was ecologically efficient.
Most interestingly, the analysis also revealed the predicted three-way
interaction between pool size, group norm, and physical distance, F(1, 79) 5
6.5, p , .05, g
2 5 .08. When the pool size was large, the interaction between
physical distance and group norm became significant, F(1, 79) 5 3.9, p ,
.05, g
2 5 .05. In that first stage, simple effects analyses of group norm within
the single conditions of physical distance showed that only in the small
distance condition did a significant difference appear between people
receiving feedback about the group’s high consumption and people getting
TABLE 1
individuals’ consumption behavior
Pool size
Perceived
group norm
Physical distance
Total M Grand M
Large
(Internet)
Small
(laboratory)
MS DM S D
Large Inefficient,
n 5 46 (low use)
353.0 89.8 327.8d 106.2 343.1b 370.7a
Efficient,
n 5 37 (high use)
370.6g 109.7 428.4d,g 72.0 405.0b
Small Inefficient,
n 5 46 (high use)
249.7f 107.3 257.4e 132.0 252.7c 196.5a
Efficient, n 5 37 (low use) 152.8f 127.7 108.7e 68.1 126.6c
Grand M 287.5 279.4 283.5
Means and standard deviations of individuals’ consumption behavior by group norm, physical
distance, and pool size. Higher values represent higher consumption on a scale from 0 to 500
(Wh). Values with the same subscript differ at p , .05 and are referred to in the results section
as comparisons between particular cells. N 5 83.
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feedback about the group’s low consumption, F(1, 79) 5 11.5, p , .001, g
2
5 .13 (for means, see Table1, comparison d). In support of our hypothesis,
the group norm manipulation in the first stage affected participants who
were close to each other in the laboratory (327.8 vs 428.4) but not those who
were farther apart (353.0 vs 370.6). Furthermore, only the increase in
consumption due to the feedback about the group’s high and efficient use
turned out to be a significant effect of physical distance, F(1, 35) 5 3.8, p 5
.05, g
2 5 .10 (for means, see Table1, comparison g), but the decrease due to
the feedback about the group’s low and inefficient use was not. In support
of our hypothesis, the physical distance between participants had a
significant effect on behavior only when the perceived group norm was
ecologically efficient. When the group norm was inefficient, the effect of
physical distance disappeared.
In contrast, when the pool size was small we did not find an interaction
between physical distance and group norms, F 5 1.1. Participants in the
Internet and in the laboratory showed significant reactions to the group
norm (for means, see Table1, comparisons e and f), although there is a clear
trend that laboratory participants reacted more strongly than Internet
participants, especially when the feedback about the group’s use was low, F
5 1.9. When the feedback about the group’s use was high and the pool size
was small the physical distance no longer made a difference, F , 1. To
summarize, with a small pool size there was a tendency towards larger
effects of physical distance on behavior when the perceived group norm was
ecologically efficient.
For further illustration, Figure2 shows the reported three-way interaction
between group norms, physical distance, and pool size. Participants
following an efficient group norm differed between the conditions of
physical distance when the pool size was large, and showed at least such a
tendency when it was small (black bars vs white bars). However,
participants following an inefficient group norm did not (light gray bars
vs dark gray bars). Figure2 also shows the transition stage where behavior
in all conditions was very similar.
The importance of others’ behavior as mediator
The answers on the corresponding item were analyzed with a 2 (group norm:
ecologically efficient vs inefficient) 6 2 (physical distance: large vs small) 6
2 (pool size: large vs small) analysis of variance (ANOVA) with repeated
measures on the last factor. As expected, the analysis revealed a between-
subjects effect of physical distance, F(1, 79) 5 4.8, p , .05, g
2 5 .06.
Participants in the laboratory (M 5 4.39; SD 5 1.19) attached more
importance to the group norm than participants in the Internet (M 5 4.01;
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SD 5 1.10). This result supports our assumption of a diminished
importance of group norms to participants who are physically farther apart.
Because significant behavioral effects are a precondition for a mediation
analysis, we could only conduct it in conditions where physical distance had
shown significant main effects on consumption behavior. Although in our
previous analyses of consumption behavior significant interactions have
shown that physical distance indeed moderates the effect of group norms in
a theoretically reasonable manner, only one simple main effect reached
significance. This was the case when pool size was large and the group norm
was efficient (see Table1, comparison g, n 5 37). Consequently, we applied
the mediation analyses procedure to this particular condition only.
Applying the procedure of Baron and Kenny (1986), we conducted three
regression analyses to test for mediation. In the first analysis, we found an
overall effect of physical distance on mean consumption when the pool was
large and the group norm was efficient, b 5 .31, t(36) 5 1.94, p 5 .05.
Participants in the small-distance condition (M 5 428.4; SD 5 72.0)
adapted more strongly to the feedback about the group’s high use and took
more resources than participants in the large-distance condition (M 5 370.6;
SD 5 109.7). In the second analysis, physical distance was predictive of the
Figure 2. Average consumption behavior per round (in Wh) as a function of group norm
(efficient vs inefficient), physical distance (laboratory vs Internet), and pool size (large vs small).
White triangles at the left and right border of the diagram indicate the feedback about an
ecologically efficient group norm (322Wh with a large pool, 171Wh with a small pool). Black
triangles, in contrast, indicate the feedback about an ecologically inefficient group norm
(185Wh with a large pool, 358Wh with a small pool).
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amount of reported importance, b 5 .41, t(36) 5 2.69, p , .01. Participants
in the small-distance condition (M 5 4.39; SD 5 1.19) found others’
behavior to be more important than participants in the large-distance
condition (M 5 4.01; SD 5 1.10). In the third analysis, including both
physical distance and the importance score into the equation simulta-
neously, the unique effect of importance of others’ behavior became
significant, b 5 .41, t(36) 5 2.49, p , .05, and the unique effect of
physical distance on consumption behavior became unreliable, b 5 .14, t(36)
5 0.87.
Using the Sobel test (see Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998), we found that
the reduction in effect size attributable to the importance score was
marginally significant, Z 5 1.83, p 5 .07. Thus, we obtained preliminary
evidence that the effect of physical distance on consumption behavior was
mediated by the level of importance participants attached to the group
norm, as was expected according to our motivational approach.
DISCUSSION
The present results extend previous research on group norms in commons
dilemmas by showing that conformity is strongest when the physical
distance between the actors is small and the perceived group norm is
ecologically efficient. Furthermore, our results confirm the general
importance of group norms in common pool resource management by
replicating earlier research with a different experimental design. With the
present design, we were able to show that people tend to follow the feedback
about a group’s high consumption and low consumption when resources are
abundant and when they are scarce, but always constrain their behavior by
considerations of ecological efficiency. In the following sections, we discuss
our findings in the light of previous commons dilemma research and social
psychological theories, present limitations of the present study as well as
possible future directions, and conclude by highlighting the societal
implications of our findings.
While psychological variables such as causal attributions (e.g., Rutte et al.,
1987) or individual characteristics (e.g., Kramer et al., 1986; Messick et al.,
1983) have been studied and found to moderate conformity effects, the
environmental variable of physical distance between the people who share a
common pool has been forgotten. Physical distance clearly and widely varies
in common pools; distance between the actors is greater in global than in
local resource management. While some resources, such as forests, are often
managed by a local group, others such as the earth’s atmosphere often
include a global group of users. Based on Latane ´’s Theory of Social Impact
(1981) the results of the present study show that physical distance does
indeed influence people’s bias towards group norms. Individuals who were
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sharing a common pool close to each other in the laboratory were more
inclined to follow the feedback of an efficient group norm than people who
were farther apart on the Internet.
On the one hand, the present results extend the validity of Latane ´’s
Theory of Social Impact to the domain of consumption behavior in
common pool resource management. To date, it has mostly been applied to
cognitive domains such as the frequency of memorable interactions with
others (see Latane ´ et al., 1995), and in rare cases also to overt behavior such
as buying decisions in a retail store (Argo et al., 2005). In a general sense,
therefore, our data support the view that physical space is an important and
often neglected concept for the study of social influence in daily life. On the
other hand, we have also brought forward a motivational explanation for
the distance effect on behavior: By taking the importance of the group’s
behavior as an indicator for the underlying motive to conform (see Kelley &
Thibaut, 1978), a mediation analysis has confirmed that the motive to
conform to the group’s behavior weakened with increasing physical distance
from those others, which led to reduced conformity. Thus, the effect of
physical distance, as predicted by Latane ´’s Theory of Social Impact, on
consumption behavior in a commons dilemma may have motivational roots.
When the distance between actors becomes larger they may be less
motivated to follow others’ behavior.
According to Wilke’s (1991) GEF hypothesis, besides greed and fairness,
one other motive is guiding behavior in common pool resource manage-
ment—the motive to manage the pool efficiently. Previous research has
shown the fairness and the efficiency motives to conflict sometimes in
commons dilemmas (e.g., Messick, 1986; Samuelson et al., 1986). People are
more inclined to follow others’ overuse when the resource is abundant, and
others’ conservation behavior when it is scarce. They are less inclined to
follow others’ overuse in times of scarcity and others’ conservation behavior
in times of abundance, because they would then face a conflict between
conformity and efficiency.
The present results corroborate these ideas by showing that people not
only followed efficient group norms but also went significantly beyond
them, especially when being close to each other. In contrast, people were
also guided by inefficient group norms to some degree but stayed far from
adjusting their own behavior to the group norm. Stressing the importance of
ecological efficiency, closer physical distance only led to increased
conformity when the respective group norm was ecologically efficient. In
contrast, when the group norm was ecologically inefficient, physical distance
didn’t make a difference. In this latter case, people’s behavior may primarily
be guided by the motive to use the pool efficiently, and conformity issues,
such as the physical distance between actors, may move into the
background. In sum, the present results show that people are indeed
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following different motivations when using a common pool, and these
motives can either conflict or harmonize, as is postulated by the GEF
hypothesis.
Limitations and future directions
The question to what degree social processes have local vs global character,
and what role physical distance may take in social processes, is an important
one in modern theories and simulation models in the social sciences. With
respect to social dilemmas there are several computer simulation studies
examining the effects of space on behavior (e.g., Hauert, de Monte,
Hofbauer, & Sigmund, 2002; Nowak, Latane ´, & Lewenstein, 1994; Nowak
& May, 1992; Nowak, Szamrey, & Latane ´, 1990). Empirical research,
especially experimental studies, lags behind simulation models in this area.
The present paper may serve to help fill this gap. However, several critical
issues of the present study have to be mentioned.
The manipulation of physical distance by using an Internet sample and
comparing it to a laboratory sample in the present study may be seen as an
issue. The Internet sample was not controlled and people may have
participated in many different ways, for example in a public library or at
home while eating or watching TV. Therefore, participants in the laboratory
may have been more focused on the task than the participants in the
uncontrolled sample. The fact that the two groups did not differ in terms of
their reactions to the declining pool can be taken as evidence, however, that
they completed the task with equal concentration and equal seriousness. As
intended by the manipulation, the two groups only differed in their reactions
to the feedback about the group’s consumption behavior serving as a
descriptive norm.
Apart from the smaller physical distance between participants in
the laboratory, we cannot think of a systematic difference between the
laboratory sample and the Internet sample that may have evoked the
articulate effects of conformity in the present data. Possible confounds such
as group identity, enhanced entitativity, or other group processes must have
played a similar role for people at home and people coming to the
laboratory, because in both groups the group was represented in exactly the
same way on the screen during the commons dilemma task. Furthermore,
both groups acted with the same degree of anonymity, as they were all alone
during the task, and none of them did expect to meet the other members of
the group after completion of the task. Finally, we have employed several
techniques to ensure the quality of the data collected via the Internet, such
as drop-out analyses and IP checks, to control for repeated participation
(see Reips, 2002a, 2002b; Ryf, 2003). Nevertheless, in future studies with a
similar design, people’s perceptions of physical distance should be measured
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explicitly and possible confounds such as the ones mentioned above should
be controlled for.
Future commons dilemma studies may also put an even stronger
emphasis on the motivational bases of consumption behavior and related
issues such as conformity to group norms. They may include the third
important motive of greed by assessing people’s social values, for example,
and relate them to physical distance and conformity behavior (e.g., Kramer
et al., 1986). Furthermore, survey research and field studies could tackle the
question whether physical distance does indeed make a difference for
different kinds of common pool resources (e.g., Schultz, 2002). Finally, there
could be other relevant moderators of conformity behavior in common pool
resource management, for example the level of anonymity (e.g., Kerr, 1999).
Anonymous individuals may be less inclined to follow others’ consumption
behavior than identifiable individuals because they can’t be made
responsible or sanctioned (e.g., De Cremer & Bakker, 2004).
Concluding remarks
The present study shows how insights from experimental social psychology
can contribute to solutions for the successful management of common pool
resources. At the same time, it is an example of how research on
environmental behavior can substantiate and advance social psychology
(see Stern, 2000). As this study has shown, the consumption behavior of
others had a stronger impact on an individual’s own consumption when
these others were close and the perceived social norm was ecologically
efficient. In a small neighborhood, for example, conservation behavior
could be spread through the communication of conservational group norms,
especially when it is ecologically efficient (e.g., during a crisis). For example,
if a neighbor is seen to save water during a hot summer, others in the
neighborhood are probably inclined to do the same. With global common
pool resources, in contrast, group norms are less effective instruments for
behavioral change, even if the ecological situation would demand such a
change. Fortunately, in many instances of global resources (e.g., the
greenhouse effect caused by private mobility) local behavior implying small
interpersonal distances plays a major role.
Manuscript received 4 October 2005
Manuscript accepted 18 January 2007
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